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Abstract
The role of mathematical models in physics has for longer been well
established. The issue of their proper building and use appears to be
less clear. Examples in this regard from relativity and quantum me-
chanics are mentioned. Comments concerning a more appropriate way
in setting up and using mathematical models in physics are presented.
1. A Quest for Clarity ...
As it happens, mathematics evokes rather strong feelings among the
variety of non-mathematicians who use it nowadays. Among them,
here we shall focus on theoretical physicists.
On one hand, we have in [W] a rather extraordinary point of view ex-
pressed by one of the old guard of Nobel laureate quantum physicists.
On the other, and rather more typically, many a physicist may see
mathematics in a way similar to having to go to the dentist ...
The mentioned view of Wigner had at the time, and ever since, re-
ceived few reactions or comments. And none of them seemed to reach
deep enough towards a better understanding of the alleged unreason-
able effectiveness. As for the other and far more frequent view of
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mathematics among physicists, it is but a rather natural and thus
an easy to understand subjective reaction of anyone whose interest is
definitely not in mathematics as such, but only in its use, if an when
unavoidable.
Let us, therefore, start by trying to clarify what is so different between
mathematics and physics, and what makes the former so unavoidable
in the pursuit of latter, and does so at least on occasions.
Clearly, both mathematics and physics, as much as chemistry and a
number of branches of engineering or biology, among others, are sup-
posed to be precise. And they certainly are so in a sense in which,
for instance, philosophy, psychology or sociology are not, and are not
even expected to be.
Above that, however, mathematics has a second essential feature, not
exhibited by any other sciences, namely, it is abstract. And this ab-
stract feature gives mathematics one of its unique powers, namely, its
generality. Indeed, the rather elementary mathematical formula 1 + 1
= 2, for instance, is not only about, say, one atom of hydrogen added
to another similar atom, and then giving two such atoms, just as much
as it is not only about one apple plus another apple, making altogether
two apples. Instead, due precisely to the abstract nature even of the
rather elementary concept of positive integer, such as 1 and 2, among
others, the above formula has such an immense generality, as to ap-
ply to no less than an infinity of specific instances. And in fact, that
infinity is so immense, as to be inconceivable even mathematically ...
In this regard, physics, for instance, does not much need to concern
itself with an inconceivable infinity of, say, hydrogen atoms, just like
biology seems in no urgent need to deal with an infinity of, say, living
cells ...
In this way, it is rather its abstract nature, thus its generality, than
merely its precision, which makes mathematics useful, if not in fact
necessary and inevitable, in a variety of other scientific pursuits. In-
deed, none of the other sciences have such an arsenal of concepts,
methods and results which, due to their immense generality resulting
from their abstract nature, may be applicable across all other sciences.
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The only comment in this regard one may make is that, as far as other
sciences are concerned, the generality of mathematics, giving its abil-
ity to deal with inconceivable infinities of specific instances, is more
than seems to be practically needed.
On the other hand, and as well known in mathematics, dealing with
infinities, be they conceivable or not, is at least since the introduc-
tion of Cantor’s set theory in the late 1800s, a rather natural internal
mathematical affair ...
And thus, one of the main issues related to the role of mathematical
modeling in physics, and more generally, in sciences, is that, so far,
we humans have not developed any other comparatively precise and
abstract, hence generally valid, science as is the case with mathemat-
ics.
A second issue in this context is quite natural as well, even if it often
leads to lots of confusion. And such confusions are, needless to say,
not limited to physics alone, even if here we shall only focus on the
way mathematical models are set up and used in physics.
Namely, a mathematical model is of course supposed to incorporate
two rather different ingredients : the insights of physics, and the math-
ematical structures available, or rather, known to those who set up the
respective specific mathematical model.
Here, naturally, two phenomena can occur : the mathematical model
will in due time undergo changes, mostly due to theoretical and exper-
imental considerations in physics, and on less frequent occasions, new
mathematics may be developed, as needed in, or even merely inspired
by, the specific mathematical modelling process at hand.
But let us see what kind of confusions may occur in such a process
of setting up, and the subsequent use of a mathematical model in
physics.
2. Absolutising the Mathematical Model ...
A rather trivial, even if not infrequent confusion is as follows. Once
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the mathematical model is set up, it produces as consequences, and
as is supposed to do of course, a number of mathematical statements.
And then, when interpreting them, it is often that one forgets the
essential difference between mathematics and physics. Namely, the
validity of such mathematical consequences is not absolute, but only
conditional. And naturally, it is conditional upon the extent to which
the considerations of physics that led to the setting up of the given
mathematical model were, first, correct as such, and second, were cor-
rectly expressed in mathematical terms.
Such a rather trivial confusion is illustrated in quantum mechanics,
according to the Copenhagen interpretation of its first von Neumann
mathematical model, for instance, [vN]. Indeed, the celebrated para-
dox of Schroedinger’s cat leads not a few to think that the state of
the cat is certainly undefined and somewhere vaguely between being
alive and dead, right until one opens the respective box and observes
that state. This, of course, is quite the same as thinking that, say,
the Moon need not necessarily be there in its place in the sky, as long
as one is not looking at it, or the fall of a tree in a forest need not
inevitably produce a noise, unless someone who happens to be nearby
would in fact hear it ...
Needless to say, interpretations of consequences of a mathematical
model of physics are welcome, being after all among the very reasons
such mathematical models were set up in the first place. And such in-
terpretation should of course have a physical nature, since it is physics
itself which, before all other disciplines, is supposed to be the benefi-
ciary of such mathematical models.
What is inappropriate, however, is to claim an overriding validity for
such physical interpretations as coming from the fact that they are
based on the given mathematical model, and then do so forgetting
that, in the first place, and as mentioned, the physical relevance of
that mathematical model is not supposed to be absolute.
Furthermore, a mathematical model is by no means supposed to de-
liver more than it was included in its original setup. And then, the only
new physical interpretations justified by such a mathematical model
are those which correspond to physical considerations that were im-
plicitly, rather than explicitly nevertheless included in it, or are merely
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the logical, even if so far not yet known, consequences of physical con-
siderations already included in the mathematical model.
In the case of Schroedinger’s cat, for instance, confusion arises, among
others, from the fact that the wave function ψ of the respective system
including the cat is a mathematical entity in the respective von Neu-
mann model, and as such it is subjected to the mathematical rules of
superposition, rules valid in absolutely any linear mathematical model,
and not only in that used by von Neumann in quantum mechanics.
Added to that comes the standard Born interpretation which is but a
bridge between mathematical probability and physics.
3. Unwarranted Implications ...
More subtle forms of misuse of mathematical models in physics may
also occur. Let us give here an example which applies both to special
and general relativity.
As it happens, and is not often noted, light, which is well known to
play a fundamental role in both these theories, does not in any way
whatsoever appear in their respective mathematical models through
any of its various physical properties, say, as a wave or as a flux of
photons, but only as a way of signalling between different points in
space. And in this regard, one only assumes the constancy in the ve-
locity of that signalling, as well as the fact that light is supposed to go,
whatever that may mean, along geodesics, which in special relativity
are of course straight lines.
Indeed, even in general relativity, such a phenomenon as the bending
of the trajectory of light due to the gravitational effect of mass is not
in any way a consequence of one or another specific physical prop-
erty of light, and as such, of its possible interaction with mass, but
solely of the curvature mass creates in space, curvature which leads to
geodesics that are no longer straight lines.
Consequently, any conclusion or interpretation based on the mathe-
matical models of these two theories and aimed at further elucidat-
ing the physical nature of light would be highly questionable, and in
fact, incorrect, since in the first place, nothing of the physical nature
of light, except as the mentioned way of signaling between different
points in space, was included in those models.
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Of course, there is a clear general awareness that in the mathemati-
cal model of special relativity there is nothing at all included about
gravitation. Consequently, physicists do not try to draw physical con-
clusions or make physical interpretations on gravitation, and do so
solely based on the mathematical model of special relativity.
On the other hand, in view of the mentioned fact that light is only
included in these two theories as a mere way to signal between differ-
ent points in space, may allow a further refinement of these theories,
the moment one may try to incorporate into them other important
physical properties or aspects of light.
4. Two Frequent Forms of Misuse ...
A third, and most frequent source of confusion, however, arises in the
insufficiently proper use of mathematical models of physics, and which
happens as follows. There is a given mathematical model of a certain
theory of physics, and then, in the everyday use of this mathematical
model there is an ever ongoing forgetting of the essential difference
between such a mathematical model, and on the other hand, the the-
ory of physics which it is supposed to describe.
Amusingly however, this is not a simple passive forgetting, but on the
contrary, a most enthusiastically active one !
And it manifests itself by ever more ”mixing up” the given mathemat-
ics with an ongoing torrent of ”physical intuitions” ...
In this regard, one can distinguish between two frequent instances of
such ongoing ”mixing up” in the inappropriate use of mathematical
models in physics.
4.1. Improper ”Tinkering” ...
A first instance is when such an ever ongoing ”mixing up” leads to no
more than an ongoing ”tinkering” where one is no longer able to be
clear enough where the mathematical precision, so essential in physics,
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ends, and where one or another, and by its own very nature, signifi-
cantly less precise ”physical intuition” is in fact replacing it ...
In this way, one is simply defeating the very reason mathematical
modeling was introduced in physics in the first place.
All that such ”tinkering” may recall are those youngsters, passionate
in their curiosity about the inner workings of, say, computers, and
who cannot stop ”tinkering” with their own computer, even if more
often than not, the consequence is that such a computer becomes of
not much effective use ...
Needless to say, ”physical intuitions” are absolutely essential in physics,
just like all other specialized intuitions are in the pursuit of their re-
spective fields of science.
What is, however, simply defeating the whole purpose of mathemat-
ical modelling is to fail to realize that, given a mathematical model,
the appropriate way to use it, when wanting to take into considera-
tion ”physical intuitions” that had not been included in it from the
very beginning, is to build from the scratch a whole new and refined
mathematical model which, this time, does include those ”physical
intuitions”.
And in this regard, a very good example is that of the transition from
special to general relativity. Indeed, after setting up special relativity,
Einstein never tried simply to flood it with torrents of ”physical in-
tuition” regarding gravitation, and based on such intuitions, to tinker
with that theory until it may eventually be able to deal with gravi-
tation itself. Instead, he simply tried to start a rather radically new
theory, and as is well known, went through several variants of it, until
in late 1915, he reached what he considered to be a good formulation
of what was to be called general relativity.
4.2. Unnecessary ”Tinkering” ...
The Bell inequalities give a clear, even if hardly known, example where
in their mathematical deduction no ”physical intuition” of any quan-
tum nature is in fact needed, yet the flood of papers with such intu-
itions seems to be never ending, thus merely perpetuating the respec-
tive lack of awareness and confusion ...
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It is estimated, [A, p. 2], that by 1978, there were no less than over
one million articles and books on the celebrated EPR paper.
It is therefore not so surprising that a similar flood has emerged re-
lated to the Bell inequalities, with one of the latest contributions being
the paper [M].
Most of such papers are, needless to say, written by physicists. Con-
sequently, they tend to exhibit, and be based upon a large variety of
”physical intuitions”.
Such a situation is not at all strange. After all, as known so well
in other human endeavours, be they philosophy, metaphysics, theol-
ogy, art, or for that matter, economics and politics, it is rather the
rule than the exception that any given more important issue does in-
evitably end up with a considerable number of views, interpretations
and comments.
Furthermore, the EPR paper happened to highlight such deeply seated
foundational issues in quantum mechanics which, ever since its publi-
cation in 1935, could not be settled.
The Bell inequalities, on the other hand, even if having foundational
implications of no lesser importance, have the extraordinary feature
to be at present easily testable by effective physical experiments. And
such tests, conducted in the early 1980s, showed clearly their vio-
lation in quantum mechanical contexts. Therefore, unlike with the
issues raised in the EPR paper, the Bell inequalities tend to provoke
discussions focused more on their quantum mechanical connection and
relevance, than on the status as a whole of quantum mechanics, or of
its various interpretations, among them, the Copenhagen one.
And yet, the flood of studies and comments on the Bell inequalities
keeps going on ...
And so far, it only seems to increase a general confusion and misun-
derstanding, and do so more than contributing to clarity. Indeed, as
shown back in 1989 by I Pitowsky, [P], the Bell inequalities happen
to belong to a more general family of inequalities in elementary prob-
ability theory, presented as long ago as in chapter 21 of the celebrated
1854 book of George Boole, ”The Laws of Thought”,[B, B1]. There-
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fore, they cannot have much to do with quanta.
What seems to be in this case the main underlying dynamics is there-
fore rather different from that in the case of the EPR paper.
And as shown in [P], [R], this dynamics comes from the fact that in
such studies and comments unnecessary and simply superfluous ”phys-
ical intuition” is being injected.
Indeed, as mentioned, the Bell inequalities are related to the family of
inequalities in elementary probability theory presented, as long ago as
during Victorian times, namely, in chapter 21 of the celebrated 1854
book of George Boole, ”The Laws of Thought”, [B], [B1].
Consequently, they cannot possibly have much to do with quantum
theory, hidden variables, local hidden variables, and so on ...
As a morale, one should recall the important methodological advise
of good old lawyers that, when dealing with an issue properly, two
sharply conflicting avenues should be pursued at the same time : to
associate with that issue everything which is relevant, and also, to
disassociate from that issue all that is not relevant.
As it happens, however, with ”physical intuition”, it appears that in
its practice it is not so easy to follow that methodological advise ...
And the flood of papers on the Bell inequalities is as clear an example
of such a failure, as any, even if it may take some time until it would
be recognized as such ...
5. What Mathematical Models Could Do for Physics ...
There is still another aspect of the less than proper use of mathematics
as a whole within physics. Namely, we refer here not so much to the
setting up of one or another specific mathematical model for a certain
theory of physics, but rather to what mathematics may inspire and
support in the process of creative imagination of physicists, which is
so essential for their ”physical intuitions”.
However, from the start, one has to note that here one may face a
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situation which may indeed be far more difficult to deal with, since it
would require no less than a truly up to date awareness on the part
of physicists about the newest possibilities offered by state of the art
mathematics. And as mentioned, here we are not talking only about
the mathematical modelling physicists become involved in, but about
the very freedom of imagination of their ”physical intuitions”, imagi-
nation which such mathematics may suggest, inspire, allow, offer and
also support.
Here we mention two such instances, and regrettably they still seem
much beyond the pale for most physicists, even if they happen to in-
volve some modern mathematics which for longer has no more been
state of the art, but rather well known and established, thus could
have been used in physics for quite some time by now.
One of them, already with some awareness in certain circles of physi-
cists, is about what scalars could and should be used in physics, see
[R3] and the literature cited there.
In this regard, one can recall that it was in the study of electricity
in the second half of the 1800s, when the use of complex scalars got
firmly established in the mathematical modelling of physics.
Fortunately therefore, there was no resistance to be encountered among
physicists by the time of Schroedinger’s use in the mid 1920s of com-
plex scalars in his celebrated quantum wave equation, and thus of von
Neumann’s subsequent use of such scalars in his first mathematical
model of quantum mechanics, [vN].
The second example regards the possible use of non-Archimedean
structures which, among others, may be appropriate, for instance,
for the mathematical modelling of space-time, [R1,R2]. And here one
should note that, no matter how successful such structures have al-
ready proved themselves in a number of important branches of math-
ematics, among them, the solution of very large classes of nonlinear
partial differential equations, the reluctance to consider them at all
has so far marked the physics community.
And amusingly, such a reluctance amounts to nothing else by a self-
censorship, imposed by that community upon itself, even if imposed
by default, as can be seen already from the rather particular example
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considered in [R1], and which can hint to the extraordinary realms of
freedom for the creativity of imagination of ”physical intuition”.
References
[1] [A] Auletta G : Foundations and Interpretation of Quantum Me-
chanics. World Scientific, London, 2000
[2] [B] Boole G : The Laws of Thought. Cambridge, Macmillan, 1854
[3] [B1] Boole G : The Laws of Thought (with an introduction by J
Corcoran). Prometeus, New York, 2003
[4] [M] Matzkin A : Is Bell’s theorem relevant to quantum mechanics?
arXiv:0802.0613v2
[5] [P] Pitowsky I : From George Boole to John Bell - the origins of
Bell’s inequalities. In Kafatos M (Ed.) Bell’s Theorem, Quantum
Theory and Conceptions of the Universe. Kluwer Acad. Publ.,
Dordrecht, 1989, pp. 37-49
[6] [R] Rosinger E E : George Boole and the Bell inequalities.
arxiv:quant-ph/0406004
[7] [R1] Rosinger E E : Cosmic contact censorship : an Archimedean
fallacy ? arxiv:physics/0702206
[8] [R2] Rosinger E E : String theory : a mere prelude to
non-Archimedean space-time structures ? arxiv:physics/0703154
[9] [R3] Rosinger E E : How far should the Principle of
Relativity go ? arXiv:0710.0226v3
[10] [vN] von Neumann J : Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantum-
mechaniek. Springer, 1932
[11] [W] Wigner E : The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics
in the Natural Sciences. Communications in Pure and Applied
Mathematics, Feb. 1906, Vol. 13, No. 1.
11
